

NARRATE AND DESCRIBE: THE PROBLEM OF EKPHRASIS*

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The subject of ekphrasis, and in particular of the ekphrasis of works of art, has recently begun to receive a great deal of attention from classical scholars.¹ As will become clear, I believe that the reason for this is that many of the theoretical issues that are most pressing in classical studies — and indeed in cultural studies in general² — are raised by the study of ekphrasis. The purpose of this note on the other hand is modest: I want to say a little about the narratological issues that are raised by set-piece description (I), and to look at one example in the *Aeneid* (II). But even so I have found it impossible not to offer some thoughts of a frighteningly general nature (III). I shall concentrate on the ekphrasis of works of art for reasons that will again become clear, but some at least of what I shall say will also be relevant *mutatis mutandis* to the ekphrasis of natural features and events.

I

Set-piece description is regularly seen by narratologists as the paradigm example of narrative pause, in the semi-technical sense of a passage at the level of narration to which

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¹ I am thinking especially of E. W. Leach, *The Rhetoric of Space: Literary and Artistic Representations of Landscape in Republican and Augustan Rome* (1988) and S. Bartsch, *Decoding the Ancient Novel, The Reader and the Role of Description in Heliodorus and Achilles Tatius* (1989), but there are currently two volumes of essays on the subject in preparation from Cambridge, on Greek texts edited by Simon Goldhill and Robin Osborne and on Latin edited by J. R. Elsner. Bartsch offers a good general bibliography: see also those in M. Fusillo, *Il Romanzo Greco* (1989), 83–90 and S. Richardson, *The Homeric Narrator* (1990), 50–69, and add amongst very recent works N. W. Slater, *Reading Petronius* (1990), 213–30, and D. Rosand, 'Ekphrasis and the Generation of Images', *Arion* NS 1 (1990), 61–105. The standard work remains that of P. Friedländer, *Johannes von Gaza und Paulus Silentiarius* (1912), 1–103; in Latin, there is an excellent survey by G. Ravenna, 'L'ekphrasis poetica di opere di arte in Latino: temi e problemi', *Quad. Ist. Fil. Lat. Padova* 3 (1974), 1–52 (see also his article 'Ekphrasis' in the *Enciclopedia Virgiliana*). The most suggestive discussion is that of A. Perutelli, 'L'inversione speculare. Per una retorica dell'ekphrasis', *MD* 1 (1978), 87–98 = *La Narrazione Commentata* (1979), ch. 2. I am not concerned

here with ekphrasis as an independent genre, as in the ekphrastic epigram: on this see of course Friedländer, op. cit., with the further bibliography in S. T. Stevens, *Image and Insight: Ekphrastic Epigrams in the Latin Anthology* (Diss. Wisconsin–Madison, 1983), and Simon Goldhill's 'Reading, seeing, meaning: the poetics of Hellenistic ekphrasis', forthcoming in the Goldhill/Osborne collection.

² I shall refer to some of the modern bibliography on description below: but note the special issues of *Yale French Studies* 61 (1981), *Poétique* 43 (1980) and 51 (1982), and *Littérature* 28 (1980), and the collections by J. Bessière, *L'ordre du descriptif* (1988), P. Bonnefils, *La Description: Nodier, Sue, Flaubert, Hugo, Verne, Zola, Alexis, Fénéon* (2nd edn., 1980), and Y. Wert-Daoust, *Description – écriture – peinture* (1987). Apart from Genette, the most important theoretician has been P. Hamon: see 'Qu'est-ce qu'une description?' *Poétique* 3 (1972), 465–85 (trans. R. Canter in T. Todorov (ed.), *French Literary Theory Today: A Reader* (1982)), and especially *Introduction à l'analyse du descriptif* (1981: an excerpt is translated as 'Rhetorical status of the descriptive' in *Yale French Studies* 61 (1981), 1–26). Note also J. Hagstrum, *The Sister Arts* (1953); J. Pelc, 'On the concept of narration', *Semiotica* 3 (1971), 1–19; M. Barchiesi, *Il tempo e il testo, studi su Dante e Flaubert* (1987); and J. van Appeldoorn, *Pratiques de la description* (1982). There is a large mass of comparative material, which often touches on issues of theory: see e.g. E. L. Bergmann, *Art Inscribed: Essays on Ekphrasis in Spanish Golden Age Poetry* (1979); A. Corbineau-Hoffmann, *Beschreibung als Verfahren. Die Ästhetik des Objekts im Werk Marcel Prousts* (1980); P. Dubois, *History, Rhetorical Description and the Epic: from Homer to Spenser* (1982); R. L. Flaxman, *Victorian Word-Painting and Narrative: Toward the Blending of Genres* (1987); P. Imbert, *Sémiotique et description balzacienne* (1978); J. Kurman, 'Ekphrases in epic poetry', *Comparative Literature* 26 (1974), 1–13; L. Perrone-Moisés, 'Balzac et les fleurs de l'écrivain', *Poétique* 11 (1980), 305–23; W. H. Race, *Classical Genres and English Poetry* (1988), 56–85; J. Ricardou, *Problèmes du nouveau roman* (1967); L. Spitzer, 'The "Ode on a Grecian Urn", or content vs. metagrammar', *Comparative Literature* 7 (1955), 203–55; M. Van Buuren, 'L'essence des choses', *Poétique* 11 (1980), 326–46 (on Claude Simon); B. Vannier, *L'inscription du corps, pour une sémiotique du portrait balzacien* (1972); M. Zink, 'Les toiles Agamanor et les fresques de Lancelot', *Littérature* 38 (1980), 43–61. The Tenth International Colloquium on Poetics held at Columbia University in 1986 was devoted to 'The Poetics of Ekphrasis' (see Rosand, above n. 1) but the proceedings have not been published.

nothing corresponds at the level of story.³ The plot does not advance, but something is described. There is an obvious sense in which description is more basic — one could theoretically imagine a narrative with only names in it, and no referring expressions, but it is practically impossible for any narrative of length not to contain description. In a deeper sense, however, as Genette noted in his article on the 'Boundaries of Narrative',⁴ description in general is secondary, is '*ancilla narrationis*, the ever-necessary, ever-submissive, never-emancipated slave'. Set-piece description is not even in any real sense *necessary*. Hence the controversial nature of description and the strong antipathy to it which critics from Lessing to Lukacs have often shown.⁵ This is connected with the issue of human interest, put in its crudest form by Lukacs in 'Narrate or Describe' with its epigraph from Marx, 'To be radical is to grasp things by the roots. The root of humanity, however, is man himself', and its declaration that 'objects come to life poetically only to the extent that they are related to men's life, that is why the real epic poet does not describe objects but exposes their function in the mesh of human destinies, introducing things only as they play a part in the destinies, actions and passions of men'.⁶ Narrative is about people, description deals with things.

It is not difficult to challenge this Aristotelian opposition of 'narrative' and 'description', and the exaltation of the telling of stories about human beings over description of things. It may be that what we are interested in in narratives is neither plot nor pictures but ideology, the values inscribed in the work through theme and imagery as much as by story and description. In essence I think this is correct, and this essay could perhaps stop here. But I want to go on talking of the *problem* of description because this primacy of plot and almost moral distaste for description⁷ has been very deeply engrained in the Western tradition. Historically, description has tended to make people nervous. As Riffaterre makes clear,⁸ this lies at the heart of the traditionally problematic status of didactic (especially scientific didactic) poetry. To allow a place for a poem about the world like the *De rerum natura*, we must explain why we are to be interested in the blind motions of atoms in the void, to answer Aristotle's exclusion of Empedocles as not imitating human action.⁹ 'Loss of problems' (in Wittgenstein's phrase) can be dangerous, because it can blind us to how lingering are the traces of the beliefs that we dismiss. So I ask the reader for the moment to join with me in worrying about description and its relation to narrative. If we accept for the moment the traditional opposition of narration and description, we can isolate three approaches which have tried to deal with the problem of their relation.

The first is to stress the role of set-piece description in 'bringing the scene before our eyes' as traditional accounts of *enargeia* put it,¹⁰ or to say with Barthes¹¹ that what we have is 'the effect of the real', that what details in a description signify is reality itself: 'Flaubert's barometer, Michelet's little door finally say nothing but this: *we are the real*'.¹² Description is admitted to be narratively (or indeed thematically) redundant, but this redundancy increases our sense of the reality of the scene before us. It is just as if we were there ourselves. Now, however, one defines these 'reality' functions of description, they are undeniable. But they do not get us very far. It was an early lesson of old-fashioned structuralism that cultural productions participate in systems of meaning independent of the conscious intentions of their creators or users. I may buy a Nissan car because of its reliability (I did) but the significations

³ See e.g. M. Bal, *Narratology, Introduction to the Theory of Narrative* (1985), 70, 76–7.

⁴ G. Genette, 'Frontiers of narrative', in *Figures of Literary Discourse* trans. A. Sheridan (1982), 127–44, at 134 (from *Figures II* (1969): see also *New Literary History* 8 (1976), 1–13).

⁵ See especially H. C. Buch, *Ut Pictura Poesis. Die Beschreibungsliteratur und ihre Kritiker von Lessing bis Lukacs* (1972). I shall return to Lessing, who has been much discussed in recent years: see the introduction to *Laocoon* trans. A. E. McCormick (1984) with D. E. Wellberg, *Lessing's Laocoon, Semiotics and Aesthetics in the Age of Reason* (1984); G. Gebauer (ed.), *Das Laokoon Projekt* (1984: collection of essays, some translated); and especially T. Todorov, 'Ésthetique et sémiotique au XVIIIe siècle', *Critique* 308 (1973), 26–39 = *Théories du Symbole* (1977), 161–78 (German translation in Gebauer).

⁶ G. Lukacs, 'Narrate or describe?' in *Writer and Critic and other Essays*, trans. A. Kahn (1978), 110–48, at 137.

⁷ Not always 'almost': as Fanny Lemoine reminds me, some of the antipathy to description may be more explicitly motivated by a contempt for the things of this world, whether from a Platonic or a Christian standpoint, just as the growth of non-allegorical descriptive poetry in modern times is bound up with Romantic pantheism.

⁸ M. Riffaterre, 'Système d'un genre descriptif', *Poétique* 3 (1972), 15–30.

⁹ cf. Tasso, *Discourses on the Heroic Poem*, trans. M. Cavalchini and I. Samuel (1973), 7–8.

¹⁰ cf. H. Lausberg, *Handbuch der literarischen Rhetorik* (1960), 399–407; G. Zanker, 'Enargeia in the ancient criticism of poetry', *RhM* 124 (1981), 297–311.

¹¹ R. Barthes, 'The reality effect' in *The Rustle of Language*, trans. R. Howard (1986), 141–8, or trans. R. Carter in T. Todorov (ed.), *French Literary Theory Today* (1982), 11–17.

¹² *idem*, 148.

'boring' and 'unstylish' which it bears when contrasted with a Porsche are independent of what I thought I was doing. Of course an interpreter can take this public signification and mess it around, but she cannot ignore it. The ekphrasis of the villain's car in a narrative may certainly bring the scene before the reader's eyes, but we can still ask what this car means against the matrix of alternative possibilities. In fact, it is striking how often set-piece description in narrative is of things that participate particularly obviously in social systems of meaning: clothing or armour, furniture, architecture, the cultivated landscape. These social systems do not determine or limit the meaning of an ekphrasis, but they already take the reader beyond the reality effect, however specified. There is therefore no real 'solution' to our 'problem' here.

The other two approaches are more important. First, we can attempt to deal with the problem of description by integrating it with the narrative. A relatively crude form of this can be found in Lessing's defence of the Homeric shield description on the grounds that not the shield but its manufacture is described:¹³ only slightly less crude is Lukacs' defence of the horse-race in Tolstoy's *Anna Karenina* against that in Zola's *Nana* on the grounds that it is 'no mere tableau but a series of intensely dramatic scenes which provide a turning point for the plot'.¹⁴ Clearly narration often continues through a description (there is rarely a complete pause) and the description may occasion reactions in participants important for the plot. But the needs of the plot can usually be satisfied by a much more exiguous account than we are offered in ekphrasis, and it is difficult to see that Lessing's device of describing the manufacture of an object rather than the object itself is other than a trick. We could easily turn any description of an object into an account of its making, but would this really get to the heart of the problem? Nevertheless, it is an important point that description is rarely 'pure', because the way that narrative impurity is introduced is often through the figure of an observer.

It is my third tactic however which is most commonly found in critical writing and which raises the most important questions, that is the relation of description to narrative on a psychological level. This can be done in several different ways. The objects described may be causally linked with a character or an action: people choose their own furniture or wallpaper. We may have an explicit or implicit observer, through whose eyes the description is instantiated. We may have an instance of pathetic fallacy, however we wish to define that: the storm outside reflects the storm inside. Or we may have much looser metaphoric or especially metonymic links with the plot, particularly ones of prefiguration:¹⁵ the flower plucked in chapter one becomes the maidenhood lost in chapter four. Much modern critical reading of ekphrasis in classical literature takes the form of an attempt to show that what earlier critics had seen as 'merely' decorative description can in fact be integrated with narrative, indeed demands to be so integrated. Precisely because ekphrasis represents a pause at the level of narration and cannot be read functionally, the reader is possessed by a strong need to interpret.

As will be seen, I believe this is the right tactic. But it is obviously vulnerable to attack, and has come under attack from post-modern theorists, for being organicist and totalizing. If we take the dominant trends in current criticism with Murray Krieger to be those which 'celebrate margins rather than centers, the aporia rather than the filled gap, the arbitrary or even the random rather than the necessary',¹⁶ then it is clear that from those points of view the way in which the classical criticism that I have been describing *integrates* ekphrasis may be seen as a minus not a plus. To relate description in this way to narration is to accept its poor relation status but to give it a limited form of social mobility: the more radical move is to free description from the chains of slavery and to give it true autonomy. The vanguard of this approach was the *nouveau roman*, particularly in the theorizing of Robbe-Grillet, with its cry that 'instead of this universe of "significations" (psychological, social, functional), one must try to construct a world more solid, more *immediate*'¹⁷ in which objects are given a role outside of any metaphorical or metonymic system of reference. Now whether the *nouveau roman* in fact achieves that independence of the object, and whether even if it did it would be relevant to

¹³ Lessing, *Laocoon*, ch. 16, e.g. trans. McCormick, op. cit. (n. 5), 84, 'we see in the poet's work the origin and formation of that which in the picture we can only behold as completed and formed'.

¹⁴ op. cit. (n. 5), 111.

¹⁵ cf. R. G. M. Nisbet, 'The Oak and the Axe: symbolism in *Hercules Oetaeus* 1618ff.', in M. Whitby,

P. Hardie, and M. Whitby (eds), *Homo Viator* (1987), 243-51.

¹⁶ M. Krieger, *A Reopening of Closure* (1989), 3.

¹⁷ A. Halsall, "'La Transition", descriptions et ambiguïtés narrativo-discursives dans "Victoire" de William Faulkner', in Bessière, op. cit. (n. 2), 27.

classical criticism are questions I want to avoid, but this anti-organicist, anti-closural movement in late-modern and post-modern criticism should make us be at least a little self-conscious about the stress on closure and integration which dominates classical criticism. A generation whose motto is 'the revenge of the crystal'¹⁸ is hardly likely to warm to a criticism which celebrates an integrating focus on human subjectivity.

Moreover, the modernist classical critic is likely to find herself stabbed in the back by reception theorists like Malcolm Heath, who would deny that ancient readers would have felt this *need to interpret* which is the standard starting-point for accounts of ekphrasis.¹⁹ I do not myself believe that Heath is right. Basic to his approach is the Hirschian opposition between 'meaning' (identified with conscious intention) and wider 'significance' as read in by modern interpreters, and the exaltation of the former characterized as historical over the latter characterized as 'the forceful imposition of alien preconceptions on ancient literature'.²⁰ It is an easy challenge to celebrate rather the latter process, and to dramatize one's critical practice as Socratic guerilla warfare. But it is more important to deconstruct the opposition.²¹ On the one hand, the belief that one can ever free oneself from contemporary concerns is a delusion that critics have always to resist if they are to avoid self-deception: it is not difficult to find elements in the present position of classical studies out of which a plausible account of the factors which encourage a cool historicism can be constructed. On the other, Heath himself admits that a basic problem with his approach is that a culture's 'primary poetic' instantiated in practice may only very imperfectly be captured by the 'secondary poetic' which is represented in the conscious theorizing of rhetoricians and commentators.²² If one takes a wider view of ancient semiotics, it is not difficult to find evidence of a strong hermeneutic imperative at all periods in phenomena like divination; and indeed even in literary studies Heath underplays elements such as the allegorical tradition, which begins in the fifth century B.C., not the fifth century A.D.²³ Moreover, it is most important not to accept the characterization of 'reading against the grain'²⁴ as necessarily unhistorical; to accept the conscious formulation of its own values by a culture (or some members of it) as authoritative looks more like a denial of history. One must both resist the simplification of ancient attitudes and accept that the critic may at times stress elements that members of a culture neglected precisely in the name of history. But Heath's attack is an important reminder that there is nothing necessarily natural or inevitable about modernist integrationism: it is an aesthetic that has to be defended. We have another reason not simply to take as an obvious given that the first thing one does with the description of an apple is to find a young virgin to whom it might correspond.

I want to return to these themes at the end, but I hope it is already clear how the way in which we approach ekphrasis is paradigmatic of our attitudes to much wider issues of interpretation. Let me, however, turn to a question that is constantly raised with respect to ekphrasis, that of 'point of view'.²⁵ I mentioned above that one way in which description is often related to narrative psychologically is through the figure, explicit or implicit, of the observer. This is put most strongly by J. Kittay:²⁶

When we read a representation, we also read, or read in, the account of the perception of that representation . . . There is always a choice of percipients. We can read an act as perceived by the character who carries it out (our hero, for example), by the character who is or will be its object, or by any character who might react to it, appreciate it, or be confused by it (e.g. an onlooker, a confidant, a chorus) . . . There are no autonomous limits on this power of inference and construction, this reading-in of subjectivity, as there must be at least the possibility of access (imaginative as well as provided) to a subject-based reading of the represented. Empathy is available, of one character for another, of the narrator for any character, and of the reader for anyone.

¹⁸ J. Baudrillard, *Les stratégies fatales* (1983); cf. D. Kellner, *Jean Baudrillard, From Marxism to Post-modernism and Beyond* (1989), 154–62.

¹⁹ M. Heath, *Unity in Greek Poetics* (1989): see also *The Poetics of Greek Tragedy* (1987), 98–111.

²⁰ *idem*, 155.

²¹ cf. D. Kennedy, rev. S. J. Harrison, *Oxford Studies in Vergil's Aeneid, Hermathena* (forthcoming).

²² *op. cit.* (n. 19), 10.

²³ cf. J. Whitman, *Allegory, the Dynamics of an Ancient*

and Medieval Technique (1987), with further bibliography: on Theagenes of Rhegium, conventionally made the *protos heurtes* of allegory, see R. Pfeiffer, *History of Classical Scholarship* 1 (1968), 9–11.

²⁴ J. Winkler, *The Constraints of Desire* (1990), 126.

²⁵ For my use here of Genette's 'focalization' (and some of the problems with the concept), see 'Deviant focalization in Vergil's *Aeneid*', *PCPhS* 216 (1990), 42–63.

²⁶ 'Descriptive limits', *Yale French Studies* 61 (1981), 225–43, at 234.

The question of focalization, of 'who sees?', is raised with particular and obvious force by description. Basic to Lessing's famous distinction of literary and plastic art were two notions: first, that 'succession of time is the province of the poet just as space is that of the painter',²⁷ and second, that linguistic signs are arbitrary, visual ones iconic. A picture of a cat looks like a cat, the word 'cat' does not. Again these are distinctions which invite and have received a great deal of deconstruction, but which I want for the moment to accept. Both of these aspects of the literary description reinforce our feeling that a literary description necessarily inscribes a point of view more strongly than a plastic one. On the one hand, there is the phenomenon of what the linguist W. J. M. Levelt has referred to as the speaker's linearization problem:²⁸ when we describe in words a scene, we have to decide the order in which we are to present the details and the duration — which may be zero — of the description of each of them. Narratologically, that is, the visual scene described functions as story to the narration of the verbal description. There is no neutral, zero-focalized way of linearizing a visual scene: a point of view is necessarily inscribed, though there may be accepted ways in a particular culture of ordering the elements — asked to describe their house, for instance, most people will give a mental tour starting at the front door and climaxing according to predilection in the kitchen, the bedroom or the study. The focalization does not, of course, have to be that of the actual observer: as Kittay remarks, empathy is available, and I can describe my house to a friend in a way that represents neither the way I see it nor the way she does, but the peculiar interests of my aunt. But the speaker's solution of the linearization problem *necessarily* imposes a point of view. Similarly, the non-iconic nature of the linguistic sign means that there is a much wider matrix of choice against which a particular element is seen. In his work *1912 + 1*, Sciascia describes a photograph of an Arab being shot amongst the dunes during the Italian imperialist war in Libya, and implicitly highlights the contrast between the emotional reaction of a modern to the scene with the presumed contemporary reading:²⁹

In Cirenaica la guerriglia pungeva. Tribunali di guerra assiduamente sedevano per giudicare i ribelli: e cioè per passarli ai plotoni d'esecuzione. Agli italiani ne arriva qualche immagine: schizzi, fotografie. Con qual sentimento è stato allora guardata questa fotografia che ho sotto gli occhi, della fucilazione di un arabo tra le dune? Il plotone schierato su due file, l'ufficiale che sta per dare il segnale del fuoco, il condannato che sembra lontanissimo dal plotone, come sperduto tra l'ondulazione della duna. Agosto 1913. 1912 + 1.

In Cyrenaica the guerrilla war was causing irritation. Courts martial were in constant session to pass judgement on the rebels — that is, to hand them over to the firing squads. A few images of this reached the Italian public: sketches, photographs. What was their feeling then when they looked at this photograph that I have before me, depicting the shooting of an arab in the midst of the dunes? The platoon lined up in two lines, the officer waiting to give the order to fire, the condemned man looking a long way away from the firing squad, almost lost amongst the undulating dunes. August 1913. 1912 + 1.

Sciascia attempts to describe the scene neutrally, like a camera with the shutter open. But his choice of 'fucilazione', like my choice of 'being shot' must be contrasted with alternatives like 'being executed', 'being murdered', 'being martyred'. The same photograph can be read as a sign of triumph or an indictment of crime, but verbal description has to take a stand, however 'objective' it attempts to be. Again, there is an obvious sense in which description in language inscribes a point of view more forcefully and more unambiguously than plastic art.

Now I stress again that these oppositions are in actual fact far more complex: deconstruction is here as easy and as necessary as with the other oppositions that I have already discussed. There are of course various ways in which narrative art can exist, through conventions of placement, the use of panels and frames, the representation of more than one moment of time in one picture.³⁰ In an architectural setting viewpoint may be 'controlled', as Robin Osborne has argued with regard to the Parthenon frieze.³¹ The converse of the speaker's linearization problem is the artist's non-linearization problem, how to represent time through

²⁷ Trans. McCormick, op. cit. (n. 5), 91.

²⁸ W. J. M. Levelt, 'The speaker's linearization problem', in H. C. Longuet-Higgins, J. Lyons, and D. E. Broadbent (eds), *The Psychological Mechanisms of Language* (1981), 305–15.

²⁹ L. Sciascia, *1912 + 1* (1986), 17.

³⁰ cf. R. Brilliant, *Visual Narratives: Story-telling in*

Etruscan and Roman Art (1984), with bibliography; on some theoretical problems, see N. Goodman, 'Twisted tales; or, story, study, and symphony', in W. J. T. Mitchell (ed.), *On Narrative* (1981), 99–115.

³¹ 'The viewing and obscuring of the Parthenon frieze', *JHS* 107 (1987), 98–105.

simultaneity, and there are various ways of solving this. In the literary description of a work of art, we may find traces of both linearization and non-linearization: the cleverest example I know is that of the ekphrasis in Moschus, where the story of Argos and Io which was non-linearized by the artist in spatial terms is then relinearized by Moschus in a way which allows both processes to be seen.³² Then too, Lessing has often been criticized for taking as his paradigm sculpture in the round: there is an even more obvious sense of point of view inscribed in a panel painting. My example from Sciascia of a photograph might be said to be cheating: figurative painting is not simply the accurate representation of reality. Nor even is photography. Art however realist is no more 'naturally' iconic than literature: in both the signs are read according to systems of meaning that are cultural constructs. In the end, visual art is not significantly different from literature.

Nevertheless, Lessing's oppositions can be used to stress a paradox about visual and literary description which seems to me of great importance for contemporary classical cultural criticism. The tendency of the traditional view of art that I have been outlining is that visual art must be more open, less tied to a point of view, less fixed in its interpretation than literary art in which a point of view is constantly imposed by the medium. Yet we are used to literary critics being addicted to ambiguity and polysemy, while art critics are often rigidly historicist. This is particularly true of the criticism of ancient art, where the revolt against the 'connoisseur' tradition instituted by Beazley in the footsteps of Giovanni Morelli³³ has used as its principal weapon a strictly functionalist methodology. There are of course exceptions to this: indeed some of the critics of ancient art whose methodology has been most rigorous (and successful) in its functionalism have also taken pains to stress the polysemy of the artistic scenes they have discussed.³⁴ But the confident historicism of much ancient art criticism is in striking contrast to the (by now clichéd) rhetoric of 'crisis' that has gripped art history more generally.³⁵ In the study of Roman art especially, the stress in recent criticism has been on remorselessly showing how artistic production serves the dominant ideology. A good example is E. Lefèvre's recent discussion of the Portico of the Danaids in Augustus' temple-complex on the Palatine.³⁶ The interpretation of this monument has always been problematic: Lefèvre argues that the Danaids who murdered the sons of Aegyptus are to be seen as a symbol of the Romans in their recent triumph over Cleopatra, the *Aegyptia coniunx*. Often of course the Danaids are seen as sinners, but for Lefèvre it is axiomatic that such an interpretation is impossible.³⁷ But how could artist or patron stop ancient readers taking a different view of the Danaids, especially when the alternative view is so strongly represented in Augustan literature?³⁸ Lefèvre's view of the monument leads him to try to read the famous scene on the *balteus* of Pallas in the *Aeneid* in similar terms, with Pallas as the worthy Danaids and Turnus the dastardly Egyptians.³⁹ Once the argument moves into literature, its deficiency is clear: one could not say Lefèvre's view of the *balteus* was impossible, but it is easy to show that very different views are (at least) equally plausible and that no amount of evidence for an Augustan reading could remove the

³² Moschus, *Europa*, 37–62. Three scenes are described: Io crossing the sea (44–9), Zeus turning her back into a woman (50–4), and the phoenix arising from the blood of the dead Argos (55–61). That is, the order of the scenes chronologically is ACB (or conceivably ABB if the second and third scenes were taken to be contemporaneous). In the last scene, first Hermes is described; then 'nearby' Argos with sleepless eyes; then the bird arising (described in the imperfect, *exanetellen*); then its outspread wings. The temporal sequence in the last scene represents the spatial arrangement on the cup, but in such a way that the temporal sequence in the story that the visual representation supposedly had to delinearize shows through. Reading narrative art is relinearization.

³³ On the origins of Morelli's methods, see Carlo Ginzburg's brilliant 'Clues: roots of an evidential paradigm', in *Myths, Emblems, Clues*, trans. J. and A. C. Tedeschi (1990).

³⁴ See especially the work of Christiane Sourvinou-Inwood, e.g. 'Menace and pursuit: differentiation and the creation of meaning', in C. Bérard, C. Bron and A. Pomari (eds), *Images et société en Grèce ancienne. L'iconographie comme méthode d'analyse*, Actes du Colloque International, Lausanne 8–11 février 1984

(1987), 41–58, at 42: 'no sign has a fixed meaning . . . signs are polysemic . . . not all the meanings produced by the signifying elements in a signifier contribute to the production of one unified coherent meaning. Some can produce different perspectives, warring discourses, which deconstruct the dominant one.'

³⁵ cf. D. Preziosi, *Rethinking Art History* (1989).

³⁶ E. Lefèvre, *Das Bild-Programm des Apollo-Tempels auf dem Palatin*, *Xenia* Heft 24 (1989).


³⁷ *ibid.*, 15: 'Es wäre zudem absolut widersinnig gewesen, wenn Oktavian im Siegesjubiläum über die Ägypter an dem Siegesmonument par excellence eine Darstellung zugelassen hätte in den Ägypter als Ehrenträger erschienen.'

³⁸ cf. P. Hardie reviewing Lefèvre in *CR NS* 40 (1990), 520.

³⁹ *op. cit.* (n. 36), 16, 'Turnus ist ein Angreifer, dessen Tat negativ zu bewerten ist: für sie hat er zu büßen. Er kann also nur mit den angreifenden Aegyptus-Söhnen verglichen werden, deren schändliches Handeln (*nefas*) ein schmähhliches Ende (*foede*) gefunden hat. Und Pallas ist mit den Danaiden verglichen, insofern er freventlich angegriffen wird. Auf ihn bezogen muss die Aussage der *balteus* lauten: Pallas wird gerächt werden. Man beachte auch die Anspielung: Pallas kommt vom Palatin!'

alternative traces left by the complexity of the tradition. My argument is not that art critics are wrong to argue like this, or that we should simply switch to seeing art as more open: I think there *is* a genuine paradox in our attitude to art as both more open and more closed than literature that is not to be resolved by coming down unambiguously on either side. But there is a strong case for a greater awareness of this paradox — which, as we shall see, I believe was recognized in antiquity.

Our paradoxical intuition (if by now we have acquired one) that art is both more closed and more open than literature makes the phenomenon of ekphrasis where they meet of peculiar interest. Whatever position we adopt as to the degree to which plastic and literary art inscribe points of view, in literary ekphrasis the presence of the intermediary — usually fictional — visual artist introduces another potential focalizer. This is particularly the case where there is an underlying narrative element in the visual representation being described. Even leaving out the more extreme possibilities that Kittay mentioned, we then have a complex hierarchy of potential points of view, which can be summarized in the following diagram:



That is, of any element in a description we can ask whether the focalization is that of the artist who made the original work of art, or his audience, or the observer, or his audience, or the author, or his audience: and we have still not brought in the observer's brother-in-law whom chapter four will reveal to be the hero of the novel.

II

Let me try to make this clearer with my example, the famous ekphrasis in Book One of the *Aeneid* where Aeneas looks at the depiction of events from the Trojan War in the Temple of Juno in Carthage.⁴⁰ Aeneas is here an explicit observer, whose reactions to what he sees are also explicitly stated: he weeps and groans because of what he saw, *namque videbat . . .* Moreover, within episodes, as Eleanor Leach observes,⁴¹ 'the order of presentation creates confusion between the visual image and Aeneas' thoughts'. This is clearest in the Troilus panel, where Troilus is depicted both *fugiens* (474) and being dragged by his chariot (476):

parte alia fugiens amissis Troilus armis,
infelix puer atque impar congressus Achilli,
fertur equis curruque haeret resupinus inani,
lora tenens tamen; huic cervix comaeque trahuntur
per terram, et versa pulvis inscribitur hasta.

In another part of the picture poor Troilus, a mere boy and no match for Achilles, had lost his armour and was in full flight. His horses had run away with the chariot and he was being dragged along helpless on his back behind it, still holding on to the reins. His neck and hair were trailing along the ground and the end of his spear was scoring the dust behind him.⁴²

⁴⁰ *Aeneid* 1.441–93. The bibliography is predictably large: see especially R. D. Williams, 'The pictures on Dido's temple (*Aeneid* 1.450–93)', *CQ* NS 10 (1960), 145–53; K. Stanley, 'Irony and foreshadowing in *Aeneid* 1, 462', *AJP* 86 (1965), 276–77; A. Szantyr, 'Bemerkungen zum Aufbau der virgilianischen Ekphrasis', *MH* 27 (1970), 28–40; N. Horsfall, 'Dido in the light of history', *PVS* 13 (1973–4), 1–13 = S. J. Harrison (ed.), *Oxford Readings in Vergil's Aeneid* (1990), 127–40; W. R. Johnson, *Darkness Visible* (1976), 99–114; C. P. Segal, 'Art and the hero: narrative point of view in *Aeneid* 1', *Arethusa* 14 (1981), 67–84; R. F. Thomas, 'Virgil's

ekphrastic centrepieces', *HSCP* 87 (1983), 175–84; D. Clay, 'The Archaeology of the temple to Juno in Carthage (*Aen.* 1, 446–93)', *CP* 83 (1988), 195–205; Leach, *op. cit.* (n. 1); J. J. O'Hara, *Death and the Optimistic Prophecy in Vergil's Aeneid* (1990), 35–9.

⁴¹ *op. cit.* (n. 32), 314.

⁴² Trans. D. West (Penguin, 1990). I use West's new version here and below because his attempt to make the description unambiguous for the reader underlines how Vergil leans the other way. For some criticism of this as a method of translation, see my forthcoming 'Brief Notice' in *G&R* 1991 (2).

Similarly the scene between Priam and Achilles from *Iliad* xxiv, is introduced with a reminiscence of what *had* happened⁴³ before the scene depicted (ll. 483–7):

ter circum Iliacos raptaverat Hectora muros
exanimumque auro corpus vendebat Achilles.
tum vero ingentem gemitum dat pectore ab imo,
ut spolia, ut currus, utque ipsum corpus amici
tendentemque manus Priamum conspexit inermis.

There too was Achilles. He had dragged Hector three times round the walls of Troy, and now was selling his dead body for gold. Aeneas groaned from the depths of his heart to see the armour stripped off him, the chariot, the corpse of his dear friend and Priam stretching out his feeble hands.

Although we are told that Aeneas sees *Iliacas ex ordine pugnas*,⁴⁴ the order and duration of the scenes has often been seen to represent a peculiar choice, which throws emphasis on the tragic elements like the death of Troilus, the first of so many dying youths in the *Aeneid*. The strongest version of this view indeed sees Aeneas as *misreading* the scenes. Nicholas Horsfall and others⁴⁵ have suggested that Aeneas got it all wrong. On this view,

Just as one would expect in a temple of Juno, the choice of pictures illustrates the success of her favourites: while Aeneas is delighted to see that Troy is not forgotten, he quite fails to observe, as we must do, that the attitude to Troy shown in these pictures is neither friendly nor sympathetic. They illustrate just those qualities which Carthaginians might admire in the victorious Greeks—greed and brutality, for which they themselves had such a fine reputation.⁴⁶

On this interpretation, we can see peeping out, especially in the final scene of Penthesilea, which clearly anticipates Dido's entry, hints of a different way of reading these scenes, a way far removed from *sunt lacrimae rerum*.

There are good grounds for rejecting the crude form of this thesis as it is put by Horsfall, who is intent on showing that Aeneas did the right thing in leaving Dido. In her opening words to Aeneas she tells of how Teucer put in at Sidon and told her of the 'casus . . . urbis /Troianae', and how he 'ipse hostis Teucros insigni laude ferebat / seque ortum antiqua Teucrorum a stirpe volebat' (623, 625–6). She associates herself with the tragic interpretation of Trojan history, and to view her as lying in so doing would be an extreme subversion to which the text gives no encouragement. Moreover, there is clearly a battle of paradigms in the depiction of Carthage; is it Phaeacia or the land of the Cyclops? The presence of art is in itself part of the evidence pushing us towards Scherie; and Diskin Clay points out that when Odysseus arrives in the Cyclops' cave, stress is laid on the fact that Polyphemus has not heard of him, whereas the fame of Troy has reached Phaeacia.⁴⁷ And finally, as Clay also stresses, one model for the scene in the temple and Aeneas' reaction is the story told variously of Aristippus and Plato of the shipwrecked philosopher coming upon geometric figures in the sand: there too what is discovered is indisputable evidence of civilization.⁴⁸ But while the view that has Aeneas deceiving himself totally cannot be right, the question of the focalization of the ekphrasis remains of importance. Take, for instance, the detail of the description of Achilles 'selling' Hector's body, 'auro . . . vendebat' (484). K. Stanley⁴⁹ pointed out that the reader here naturally thinks not of the scene in the *Iliad* but of the common scene in art and elsewhere in literature of Priam weighing out gold, and Stanley, like Horsfall, saw the presence of such a brutal scene in the temple as evidence that Aeneas' reading is fatally optimistic, though he drew very different implications, that 'in Vergil's literary and historical perspective, Achilles and Aeneas, Greek and Trojan, Roman and Tyrian are bound to that realm where the roles of

⁴³ On the use of the pluperfect, see Szantyr, *op. cit.* (n. 32) and especially Ravenna, *op. cit.* (n. 1), 34–46, quoting Servius on l. 484: 'ingenti arte utitur verbis: nam hoc loco, quia pingi potuit, praesens tempus posuit, superius, quia pingi non potuit, sed referri, perfecto executus est tempore dicendo "raptaverat" non "raptabat".'

⁴⁴ On *ex ordine* and similar expressions, see Ravenna, *op. cit.* (n. 1), 16–17.

⁴⁵ Horsfall, Stanley, Johnson, Clay, Leach, O'Hara, *opp. cit.* (n. 32) (with very different emphases!).

⁴⁶ Horsfall, *op. cit.* (n. 32), 138.

⁴⁷ Clay, *op. cit.* (n. 32), 197.

⁴⁸ *idem*, 195–6. The story is told of Aristippus in Vitruvius vi.1, and of Plato in Cicero, *Rep.* 1.20: see G. Giannantoni, *I Cirenaici* (1958), 213 (Aristippus fr. 42–3).

⁴⁹ *op. cit.* (n. 32), 276–7.

the slayer and the slayed are inevitably united by the reversals of time — where, indeed, “sorrow is implicit in the affairs of men”. The depiction of Achilles as cruel and mercenary is of course anyway ambiguous: that could be a Trojan view as much as a Greek one. But can we be certain that the scene before Aeneas was the ‘brutal’ version? *vendebat* could represent Aeneas’ interpretation of the scene; one might say that *auror* pushes the reader towards seeing the scene as genuinely one of ransom because it looks like one of those details in ekphrasis which are simultaneously about the painterly surface and an object in the story being depicted,⁵⁰ but the existence of the golden ransom is scarcely underplayed in the *Iliad* version of the meeting.⁵¹ In this ekphrasis where so much is clearly ‘read-in’ rather than ‘seen’ — insofar as such a distinction holds — it is not impossible that this too is Aeneas’ view rather than what is actually ‘there’.

As often with questions of focalization, there is more than one story that we can tell here of whose points of view the pictures and their descriptions represent.⁵² Like other scenes of ekphrasis, the scene is often — and surely rightly in some degree — taken as paradigmatic for the interpretation of art, both literary and visual.⁵³ Eleanor Leach,⁵⁴ for instance, comments that the interaction between Aeneas as reader and the work of art ‘will not appear foreign to the contemporary reader who understands that meaning is not the inherent property of a text but is instead created in variant forms through variant experiences of reconstructing the work as text’, and that Aeneas’ ‘deeply sentimental misreading of the frieze shows the process of perception as one of selection, amplification, and reordering, and thus it casts doubt upon the reliability of factual communication through pictorial narrative’. But one might take the scene as more normative and less aporetic, as enjoining upon the reader like Aeneas to read tragically rather than triumphantly, whatever the picture that is offered. This has obvious relevance to the interpretation of Augustan art. As I mentioned above, contemporary criticism of Augustan art is dominated by functionalism and historicism: it attempts to show how subjects that are apparently aesthetically neutral actually serve Augustan ideology. If we take the scene in *Aeneid* I as paradigmatic, however, it suggests that more allowance should be made even within a historicist framework for more than one way of reading the symbols: that after all an observer might be able to deconstruct Roman art as well as Roman literature. The suggestion would not perhaps be unparalleled. In a well-known article on Philostratus and Homer whose importance Bartsch has recently stressed, Lesky had suggested that some of the passages in the *Imagines* were clear ‘misreadings’ of the underlying picture, not through misunderstanding but as a tour-de-force of ‘sophistischer Deutungskunst’.⁵⁵ Misreading and cross-reading are not necessarily modern critical inventions: and the ekphrasis in *Aeneid* I with its stress on the complexity of interpretation cannot be entirely isolated from its time. Too New Historicist a reading of Augustan art begins to look unhistorical.

III

In conclusion, I want to return to the issues with which I began in the light of the complexities of focalization which have emerged in the example from the *Aeneid*. I said that my sympathies were still very much with the organicist New Critical approach which would seek links between ekphrasis and the narrative of which it is part, but I also implied that the challenge of post-modern dislike of this as totalizing and authoritarian needed to be taken on board. The political metaphors are of course basic to the assault of post-modern theorists like

⁵⁰ cf. Ravenna, *op. cit.* (n. 1), 14–16, R. Debray-Genette ‘La Pierre descriptive’, *Poétique* 11 (1980), 293–333 on Heliodorus v. 14, which self-consciously plays with the convention.

⁵¹ cf. *Iliad* xxiv. 76, 119, 137, 146–7, 175–6, 195–6, 228–37, 367, 381–2, 435–6, 502, 555, 579, 594, 685–6. I owe this point to Alessandro Barchiesi, who comments: ‘It is too easy to forget that ransom, and gold, plays a role in Homer’s narrative too. If Aeneas was a reader of the *Iliad* (and in a sense he is) he could still point out exactly the same points: cruelty, golden ransom, the gesture of a father. This would be a selective, and tendentious,

reading, but understandable from a Trojan point of view; Priam in *Aeneid* 2 provides a counterbalance.’

⁵² cf. *PCPhS* 216 (1990), 42–63.

⁵³ This point might be strengthened by Richard Thomas’ suggestion, *op. cit.* (n. 32), that the presence of the *peplos* at the centre of the ekphrasis (479–82) constitutes a sort of *mise en abyme* in the light of the tradition of ekphrastic *peploi*.

⁵⁴ *op. cit.* (n. 32), 323–3.

⁵⁵ Bartsch, *op. cit.* (n. 1); A. Lesky, ‘Bildwerk und Deutung bei Philostrat und Homer’, *Hermes* 75 (1940), 38–53, at 45 = *Gesammelte Schriften* (1966), 11–25, at 17.

Lyotard on theories of interpretation which aim for a fixed overall truth: that way fascism lies. A carnivalesque dialogic looks radical against *that*. But it is not simply residual Stalinism that makes Marxist critics in particular⁵⁶ feel unhappy about the assumption that stress on plurality is always radical. It can be a way of evading the difficult task of formulating a properly complex account of the relationship of the individual and society. If we move back from politics to the text, we can similarly try to formulate an account of the relationship of a description to its narrative which takes adequate account of complexity but does not simply liberate the ekphrasis to meaninglessness.

A way forward is perhaps to be found in a neglected contribution by Alessandro Perutelli.⁵⁷ He set up an opposition between the total subordination of description to narrative that he saw in the shield descriptions in the *Seven against Thebes*⁵⁸ with the total independence of description and narrative represented by the *Aspis* of Hesiod, and contrasted both with the relationship to be seen in Moschus' *Europa*, where there is an 'inversione speculare': Io of the ekphrasis corresponds not to Europa but to Zeus as the bull. This relationship he termed neither *narrative* (where description is subordinated to narrative) nor *descriptive* (where it is set free) but *rhetorical*, conferring on the ekphrasis the status of a *figure*. Although his examples are limited ones, this seems a very important insight. The most interesting recent work on all types of 'digression' or narrative pause has been that which views the relationship with the main narrative as a figured one, in which elements shift and are transformed as we move from detail to whole. Perutelli's 'specular inversion', for instance, is clearly related to the way that Colin Macleod treated the mythological example in his well-known article, 'A use of myth in ancient poetry'.⁵⁹ Discussing Catullus 68, he noted that in the exemplum of Laodamia and Protesilaus both Catullus and Lesbia are compared and contrasted with both figures:

The myth, then, of Catullus 68 is neither a decorative and learned irrelevance, nor does it simply mirror the situation in which it is set; for the analogies between the two are qualified by no less significant contrasts. But the result of such a complexity is not mere confusion; the myth, by indicating an area of feeling beyond the direct statements of the poem, helps to express a significant conflict of attitudes. It thus makes a distinct and comprehensible contribution to the whole.

Similarly, in discussing similes, Oliver Lyne has recently tried to move beyond the alternatives of multiple-correspondence and decorative independence:⁶⁰

There is thus in most similes a visible point of contact with the narrative and an illustrative function tied to it which is often advertised; in many similes further points of contact and illustrative functions can be discerned. But this sort of function is not I maintain the important or main function of a developed simile in the hands of a master. The main function of a simile is not to illustrate something already mentioned in the narrative, but to *add* things which are not mentioned, in a different medium: imagery. The poet is switching modes, switching from direct narrative to 'narrative' in the suggestive medium of imagery; and he capitalizes on the fact that he is now operating in a suggestive, not an explicit medium. An advertised illustrative function and concomitant point of contact with the narrative may often be seen as a means to an end, as little more than a formal device to effect the switch from direct narrative to 'narrative' in imagery.⁶¹

Similes and even more exempla bear, of course, different relationships to their contexts from that we might wish to posit for set-piece description. But both these formulations reflect a similar desire to Perutelli's for an account of the relation of part to whole which is significant in a non-reductive way.

⁵⁶ See e.g. some of the pieces in the collection edited by M. Krieger, *The Aims of representation* (1987), especially D. LaCapra, 'Criticism Today'.

⁵⁷ *op. cit.* (n. 1).

⁵⁸ The choice is ironic in the light of Froma Zeitlin's *Under the Sign of the Shield: Semiotics and Aeschylus' Seven against Thebes* (1982).

⁵⁹ *CQ* NS 24 (1974), 82–93, at 88 = *Collected Essays* (1983), 159–70, at 165.

⁶⁰ *Words and the Poet* (1989), 68.

⁶¹ It is interesting to observe how Lyne the 'English

empiricist' comes close to the terms in which a modern French critic, L. Perrone-Moisés, has discussed description in Balzac, *op. cit.* (n. 1). Distinguishing between 'static' description, 'à fonction redondante, qualificante, explicative ou emphatique' and 'dynamic', 'à fonction de déplacement, de compensation, de défoulement', she comments that whereas the first 'renvoie circulairement a un déjà-dit du récit', the second produces another level of narrative: 'la description apparaît ici non comme un arrêt du récit (pour renseigner, reposer, distraire ou convaincre le lecteur), mais comme le suit du récit à un autre niveau'.

Perutelli's use here of the concept of 'figure' suggests an obvious comparison with Gian Biagio Conte's similar use to explain the phenomenon of allusion:⁶²

Thus allusion works in just the same way, and in the same semantic area, as a rhetorical figure. The gap in figurative language that opens between 'letter' and 'sense' is also created in allusion between that which is said (as it first appears), a letter, and the thought evoked, the sense. And just as no figure exists until the reader becomes aware of the twofold nature of figurative language, so too allusion only comes into being when the reader grasps that there is a gap between the immediate meaning ('after *I* have sailed through many peoples and on many seas⁶³) and the image that is its corollary ('as *Odysseus* sailed'). In the art of allusion, as in every rhetorical figure, the poetry lies in the simultaneous presence of two different realities that try to indicate a single reality . . . The poetry lies in the area carved out between the letter and the sense. It exists by refusing to be only one or the other. This still unknown area, this tension between meanings, can be described only by referring to the two known limits that demarcate it.

Just as with allusion, with any passage where in any sense we for a moment 'stand back' from the narrative we have the presence of two realities: the passage taken in isolation and its wider context. While as with allusion the extremes set the limits of meaning, what matters in the significance of the simile or ekphrasis or exemplum is that which in Conte's words 'exists by refusing to be only one or the other'. Any relationship we posit is inevitably an *uneasy* one. Precisely because the correspondences and contrasts are figured, the interpretation of them cannot be simple or clear: there is room for disagreement. We are conscious not only of a desire for integration but of a resistance to it. There is more than a whiff of the *Zeitgeist* here. I have excused my use of political terminology on the grounds that it is so used by post-modern critics, but this is an evasion: I believe that they are correct to see a connection between textual and political integration. And it is tempting to suggest that the troubled integration of the ekphrasis or example or simile or intertextual reference as *figure* represents the same attempt at a *palintonos harmonia* as the critics of Lyotard and other post-modernists have suggested as an alternative to the simple celebration of individualism in the political sphere.

We have moved a long way from the formalist narratology with which I began: perhaps too far. But it is important, I believe, to see that this movement is inescapable. It is a common criticism of narratology that it is merely another twentieth-century formalism, a way of talking about texts without bringing in ideology. In fact, however, if the issues raised by formal analysis are pursued, we find we cannot escape the movement towards politics. The relationship between the aesthetic and the political is not a simple one: the analogies and contrasts drawn are precisely themselves *figured* in the way that I have suggested are those between ekphrasis and narrative. And as figured, they can of course be interpreted in different ways. But the relationship is no more to be denied than ekphraseis are to be separated from their contexts — or reduced to them.

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⁶² G. B. Conte, *The Rhetoric of Imitation* (1986), 38–9.

⁶³ Conte is discussing the allusion to the opening of the *Odyssey* in Catullus 101.